Grant, D.C. (2002). Becoming Conscious and Schizophrenia. Neuropsychoanalysis, 4:199-207.

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(2002). Neuropsychoanalysis, 4:199-207

Becoming Conscious and Schizophrenia

Donald Charles Grant, FRANZCP, MRCPsych. Author Information

Freud's thoughts on consclousness lie scattered throughout his Complete Works. Nevertheless they constitute a substantial theory of consciousness, summarized here. Based on clinical material I am suggesting the following modification of Freud's theory of consciousness: the indirect route that a specific internal emotional experience takes to enter consciousness is not by association with a “substitutive idea” (Freud, 1915) but by the subject's interaction with a material object of the senses. Based on further clinical material I am suggesting that the following sequence may occur once self and object consciousness is established: the conscious memory of the object is able to reevoke the conscious subjective state previously experienced in relation to it. Having entered consciousness by association with an object or its memory, subjective states can then be represented by words that are objects more suitable for use in conscious secondary process thinking. Conscious secondary process thinking can facilitate understanding of defenses and foster more realistic conscious contents. Based on clinical material from another patient I am also suggesting that schizophrenia is understandable as an illness in which there has been a breakdown in the neuropsychological process of becoming conscious of the subjective self while retaining object consciousness.

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