Gedo, J.E. (1991). Between Prolixity and Reductionism: Psychoanalytic Theory and Occam... J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 39:71-86.

Welcome to PEP Web!

Viewing the full text of this document requires a subscription to PEP Web.

If you are coming in from a university from a registered IP address or secure referral page you should not need to log in. Contact your university librarian in the event of problems.

If you have a personal subscription on your own account or through a Society or Institute please put your username and password in the box below. Any difficulties should be reported to your group administrator.

Username:
Password:

Can't remember your username and/or password? If you have forgotten your username and/or password please click here and log in to the PaDS database. Once there you need to fill in your email address (this must be the email address that PEP has on record for you) and click "Send." Your username and password will be sent to this email address within a few minutes. If this does not work for you please contact your group organizer.

Athens user? Login here.

Not already a subscriber? Order a subscription today.

(1991). Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39:71-86

Between Prolixity and Reductionism: Psychoanalytic Theory and Occam's Razor

John E. Gedo, M.D. Author Information

ABSTRACT

To achieve a coherent theory of mental functioning, psychoanalysis cannot continue to explicate its observations through the "complementary" use of models based on differing premises. Moreover, the current profusion of plausible theories is unmanageably prolix; it is true, however, that theory must account for the complexity of constant shifts of developmental levels in terms of currently used adaptive devices. The simplest possible clinical theory will add to existing theories of motivation and development only the concepts needed to explicate reasons for these shifts in modes of functioning. Motivations are preprogrammed in the brain, so that theories of motivation must be congruent with neurophysiological knowledge. But the current status of a person's organismic motivations can only be inferred on the basis of the affective reactions they generate.

The acquisition of symbolic capacities changes the infant from an organism automatically striving to fulfill a preprogrammed ground plan into a creature of self-awareness able to formulate wishes and to establish those priorities among them best called "self-organization." Thenceforth various wishes may come into conflict; the need to avoid the resultant discomfort gives rise to defensive operations. Defense may take the form of regression, although the latter is generally based on established deficits in the adaptive repertory—"apraxias." If developmental progress takes place, superseded modes of behavioral organization remain forever available for contingencies wherein they are advantageous. The theory presented meets the criteria of "Occam's razor"; it remains to be seen, however, whether it does so at the cost of some reductionism.

[This is a summary or excerpt from the full text of the book or article. The full text of the document is available to subscribers.]

Copyright © 2010, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing. Help | About | Report a Problem

WARNING! This text is printed for the personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to copy, distribute or circulate it in any form whatsoever.