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PEP-Easy Tip: To save PEP-Easy to the home screen

PEP-Web Tip of the Day

To start PEP-Easy without first opening your browser–just as you would start a mobile app, you can save a shortcut to your home screen.

First, in Chrome or Safari, depending on your platform, open PEP-Easy from pepeasy.pep-web.org. You want to be on the default start screen, so you have a clean workspace.

Then, depending on your mobile device…follow the instructions below:

On IOS:

  1. Tap on the share icon Action navigation bar and tab bar icon
  2. In the bottom list, tap on ‘Add to home screen’
  3. In the “Add to Home” confirmation “bubble”, tap “Add”

On Android:

  1. Tap on the Chrome menu (Vertical Ellipses)
  2. Select “Add to Home Screen” from the menu

 

For the complete list of tips, see PEP-Web Tips on the PEP-Web support page.

Venneri, A. Shanks, M.F. (2010). A Neurology of Awareness and Belief: So near So Far?. Neuropsychoanalysis, 12(2):185-189.

(2010). Neuropsychoanalysis, 12(2):185-189

A Neurology of Awareness and Belief: So near So Far? Related Papers

Commentary by Annalena Venneri and Michael F. Shanks

Cognitive neuroscientists have used cognitive frameworks to interpret the various forms of breakdown in the “belief” system (e.g., misidentification, anosognosia, confabulation, asomatognosia, somatoparaphrenia, etc.) observed following focal (right) brain damage. Some cognitive theories can account for the formation of false beliefs but not for bizarre and persistent delusional states resistant to challenge. In his Target Article, Todd Feinberg has integrated psychoanalytic theory, detailed case study, and neuroscientific research knowledge to offer a synthetic account of these positive symptoms. Although they may appear superficially different, in his view in all of these disorders it is possible to detect abnormalities in some aspect of self-awareness and signs of regression to immature styles of thinking and ego functioning (e.g., denial, projection, splitting, and fantasy). One limitation of this argument is that apparently similar forms of brain damage and dysfunction do not always cause the same or even any abnormalities of belief and awareness. A way of confronting this objection, which Feinberg does not explore, is to use some variety of the cerebral reserve concept but specifically applied to cognitive reserve for the self-related functions as an individual diathesis to disorders of belief that makes the emergence of these symptoms more likely.

[This is a summary or excerpt from the full text of the book or article. The full text of the document is available to subscribers.]

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