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Tsakiris, M. (2013). Self-Specificity of the External Body. Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1):66-69.

(2013). Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1):66-69

Self-Specificity of the External Body Related Papers

Commentary by Manos Tsakiris

Mark Solms suggests that the internal body, equated with the id and represented at the brainstem structures, gives us the self-as-subject consciousness, while the external body, equated with the ego, is represented as an object, analogous to any other object in the world. Is memory space the sole, or at least the most important, contribution that the ego can make to the id? I would like to argue that it is not. Even though the basis of phenomenal consciousness—the “being-me” state—might be given by the brainstem consciousness, the most important function of the ego is precisely that it can represent my body as an object and identify it with the internal body. Thus, both bodies need to be represented as self-specific, and inevitably this will require the contribution of a cortical network. Both the ego and the id, in Solms's terms, co-constitute self-specificity.

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