Customer Service | Help | FAQ | PEP-Easy | Report a Data Error | About
Tip: To see translations of this article…

PEP-Web Tip of the Day

When there are translations of the current article, you will see a flag/pennant icon next to the title, like this: 2015-11-06_11h14_24 For example:


Click on it and you will see a bibliographic list of papers that are published translations of the current article. Note that when no published translations are available, you can also translate an article on the fly using Google translate.


For the complete list of tips, see PEP-Web Tips on the PEP-Web support page.

Panksepp, J. Watt, D. (2004). Antonio Damasio's Looking for Spinoza. Neuropsychoanalysis, 6(1):107-111.

(2004). Neuropsychoanalysis, 6(1):107-111

Antonio Damasio's Looking for Spinoza

Jaak Panksepp and Douglas Watt

We take this opportunity to share a few closing remarks regarding our review and Antonio Damasio's reply. First, we appreciate Damasio's commentary and feedback, and it was not totally unexpected that a fair amount of it would be critical. It is understandable that Damasio would like his body of work to be considered as a whole rather than on the basis of a single book. We would, of course, expect no less, even though our aim, as is appropriate in such a review, was to focus largely on what we perceived to be problematic messages in Damasio's most recent contribution (granted that both of us had written especially laudatory reviews of his second book, and this one did not really cover new ground but developed issues where we do have disagreements). We are glad that Damasio's clarified his position on many of the issues we raised, and in general we tend to agree with the majority of the elaborations he has provided, although we do very much regret that he experienced our position as involving any version of an indictment for his failing to adhere to what he seemed to consider our “ideological position.”

We are especially pleased that he has clarified his perspective on the issue of affective experience in other animals, for that, as he surely appreciates, continues to be a sticking-point in the study of animal mind, largely as a legacy of the behaviorist ontology. We still believe his “strategic solution” provides no obvious practical advantages compared to simply accepting affect or some version of a subjective feeling state to be an intrinsic property of emotional systems in action within an intact brain.

[This is a summary or excerpt from the full text of the book or article. The full text of the document is available to subscribers.]

Copyright © 2021, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing, ISSN 2472-6982 Customer Service | Help | FAQ | Download PEP Bibliography | Report a Data Error | About

WARNING! This text is printed for personal use. It is copyright to the journal in which it originally appeared. It is illegal to redistribute it in any form.